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TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE, HARMONIZATION AND
THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
DR HE´LE`NE LAMBERT*
Abstract Increased policy harmonization on refugee matters in the
European Union (EU), namely the creation of a Common European Asylum
System (CEAS), has created the imperative for a transnational judicial
comparative dialogue between national courts. This article is based on a
structured, focused comparison approach to examining a key element of
a transnational European legal dialogue, namely, the use of foreign law by
national judges when making their own decisions on asylum. It does so
by examining two countries, France and Britain, as representative of the
difference in legal tradition and culture within the EU in terms of the
civil–common law divide. Both case studies are structured around a common
set of empirical and jurisprudential research questions. The empirical ﬁnd-
ings reveal a surprising lack of transnational use of national jurisprudence
on asylum between judges. Nonetheless, a slight but noticeable increase in
the use of transnational asylum jurisprudence in the British and French courts
must be noted. Two broad accounts—one rational, the other cultural—are
applied in each of the case studies to explain this empirical ﬁnding. This
article concludes on the broader implications of these ﬁndings for the
establishment of a CEAS by 2012.
I. INTRODUCTION
Asylum is a policy area that, by its very nature, demands inter-state co-
operation and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention) is the basic instrument that provides for this.1 Within
the European Union (EU), the imperative for deeper cooperation is present,
given the provision for the free movement of persons within the Union. EU
Member States have committed themselves to greater harmonization of their
national laws on asylum but interpretation and application of these new EC
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laws depend to a large extent on national judiciaries. Thus, the success of the
harmonization substantially depends on the development of common judicial
understandings, principles and norms concerning refugee matters.
As a general trend, senior judges in the national courts are now commonly
and increasingly paying attention to the law of foreign countries as a guide to
their own decisions. It has even been suggested that we may be witnessing the
emergence of a global jurisprudence, especially in the area of human rights.2
This afﬁnity with foreign sources of a domestic nature is particularly present
in Commonwealth courts, due no doubt to shared legal cultures and a common
allegiance to the Privy Council; hence, Lord Bingham suggests that we may
be facing ‘a new dawn of internationalism in the English legal world’.3 In
Europe, this debate has traditionally focused on a three-dimensional dialogue:
between national judges and European judges (namely, the European Court of
Justice or the European Court of Human Rights), between European judges
themselves, and between national judges of the different Member States (that
is, the transnational dialogue). This article concentrates on the last dimen-
sion—namely, the dialogue between national judiciaries—as scholarship to
date has focused on the ﬁrst two.4 Some work has been done on the dialogue
between national judiciaries5 but not in the area of refugee law.6 Yet, refugee
law offers a particularly interesting case study because it has evolved mostly
2 A-M Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 University of
Richmond Law Review 99; ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 VJIL 1103; ‘A Global Community
of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harv ILJ 191–219; C McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?:
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) OJLS 499.
3 TH Bingham, ‘“There is a World Elsewhere”: Changing Perspectives of English Law’
(1992) 41 ICLQ 513, 515.
4 On the dialogue between European courts and national courts, see T Koopmans
‘Comparative Law and the Courts’(1996) 45 ICLQ 3, 545–556; K Lenaerts ‘Interlocking Legal
Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law’ (2003) 52 (4) ICLQ 873–906; VP Pescatore
‘Le recours dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communaute´s Europe´ennes a` des
normes de´duites de la comparaison des droits des Etats membres’ (1980) Revue Trimestrielle
de Droit Communautaire 337; T Franck and G Fox ‘Transnational Judicial Synergy’ in Franck
and Fox (eds) International Law Decisions in National Courts (Transnational Publishers, New
York, 1996). On the dialogue between European courts, see F Liche`re, L Potvin-Solis and A
Raynouard (eds) Le Dialogue entre les Juges Europe´ens et Nationaux: Incantation ou Re´alite´?
(Bruylant, Brussels, 2004); CL Rozakis ‘The European Judge as Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tulane
Law Review 257.
5 McCrudden (n 2) 499; G Canivet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds) Comparative Law
Before the Courts (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 2004);
P Legrand ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’ (1996) 45 (1) ICLQ 52; R Sefton-Green
‘Compare and Contrast: Monstre a Deux Tetes’ (2002) 1 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare´
85; BS Markesinis ‘Judge, Jurist and the Study and Use of Foreign Law’ (1993) LQR 622; and ‘A
Matter of Style’ (1994) LQR 607; BS Markesinis and J Fedtke ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (2005)
80 Tulane Law Review 11, and by the same authors, and very much based on that article, Judicial
Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? (University of Texas at Austin & UCL
Press, 2006).
6 With one exception in the form of a report written by G Gyulai ‘Country Information in
Asylum Procedures—Quality as a Legal Requirement in the EU’ (Hungarian Helsinki
Committee, 2007).
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under the inﬂuence of judges—so it has ‘become fundamentally judicialized’7
and this is reﬂected in the key role occupied by high courts as ‘agents of
normative change’.8 Furthermore, refugee law lacks an international court
competent to provide a common interpretation of the Refugee Convention
(unlike the area of human rights law for instance),9 thereby leaving it to each
Contracting State ultimately to interpret the Refugee Convention.10 In sum,
refugee law provides tremendous opportunity in terms of seeking a greater
transnational judicial role.
There is some evidence of transjudicial activity in refugee law, among
senior appellate judges in Commonwealth countries. Hathaway notes that:
Senior appellate courts now routinely engage in an ongoing and quite extra-
ordinary transnational judicial conversation about the scope of the refugee deﬁ-
nition and have increasingly committed themselves to ﬁnd common grounds.11
Judges also refer more and more to the work of leading academic autho-
rities.12 However, this trend is less in evidence outside the Commonwealth.
The International Association of Refugee Law Judges’ (IARLJ) own estimate
is that there is a problematic lack of cross-referencing between European
countries.13 But there is no study of the precise extent of this problem.
This article adopts a structured, focused comparison approach14 to exam-
ining a key element of a transnational European legal dialogue, namely the
use of foreign law by national judges when making their own decisions on
asylum. It does so by examining two Member States, France and the United
Kingdom, which represent key differences in legal tradition and culture within
7 JC Hathaway ‘A Forum for the Transnational Development of Refugee Law: The IARLJ’s
Advanced Refugee Law Workshop’ (2003) (15) 3 Intl J Refugee L 418.
8 V Guiraudon ‘European Court and Foreigners’ Rights: A Comparative Study of Norms
Diffusion’ (2000) 34 Intl Migration Rev 4 1088–1125, 1107.
9 A-M Slaughter (n 2) 121 and 127. On the use of comparative law in the UK since the HRA,
see D McGoldrick ‘The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 in Theory and Practice’
(2001) 50 (4) ICLQ 901.
10 AM North and J Chia, ‘Towards Convergence in the Interpretation of the Refugee
Convention: A Proposal for the Establishment of an International judicial Commission for
Refugees’ in J McAdam (ed) Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2008) 225–261.
11 JC Hathaway The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2005) 1–2, see also 116. Referring in particular to A-M Slaughter (n 2) 99, and
to the University of Michigan’s Refugee Caselaw Site and the establishment of the International
Association of Refugee Law Judges in 1995. See also, D E Anker ‘Refugee Law, Gender, and the
Human Rights Paradigm’ (2002) 15 Harv Human Rts J 133, 136.
12 H Storey ‘The Advanced Refugee Law Workshop Experience: An IARLJ Perspec-
tive’(2003) 15 (3) Intl J Refugee L 423.
13 Author’s discussions with Dr Hugo Storey (Senior Judge at the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal, and member of the IARLJ).
14 AL George, ‘Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison’ in PG Lauren (ed) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (Free
Press, New York, 1979) 43–68.
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the EU in terms of the civil–common law divide15. Both case studies are
structured around a common set of empirical and jurisprudential research
questions—the normative question of legitimacy is explored in section II.16
The empirical ﬁndings reveal a surprising lack of transnational use of national
jurisprudence on asylum between judges. Nonetheless, a slight but noticeable
increase in the use of transnational asylum jurisprudence in the British and
French courts must be noted. Two broad accounts—one rational, the other
cultural—are applied in each of the case studies to explain this empirical
ﬁnding. This article concludes on the broader implications of these ﬁndings
for the establishment of a common European asylum system by 2012.
II. TRANSNATIONAL EUROPEAN LEGAL DIALOGUE AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN
ASYLUM SYSTEM
The imperative for dialogue between national judiciaries within the EU comes
from the Tampere meeting of the European Council in October 1999, when
the then 15 Member States agreed to develop the EU as a common area of
freedom, security and justice. In order to do that, the Member States agreed to
work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by
making full use of the provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. The effec-
tiveness of this ‘common’ system will be somehow dependent on common-
alities. An obvious way of achieving this is through the adoption of common
legislation. In this regard, the adoption of four key Directives and two
Regulations on matters of asylum concluded the ﬁrst phase towards the es-
tablishment of a CEAS (a phase which ended in 2005).17
15 For an analysis of a wider range of cases, see GS Goodwin-Gill and H Lambert (eds) The
Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the
European Union (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009).
16 The distinction between ‘empirical’, ‘jurisprudential’ and ‘normative’ questions is bor-
rowed from C McCrudden (n 2) 499.
17 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures
in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status [2005] OJ L326 13/12/2005 13–
34; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualiﬁcation
and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted [2004] OJ
L304, 30/09/2004 12–23; Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 Establishing
the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an
Asylum Application Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National [2003] OJ
L050 06/02/2003 1–10; Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 Laying DownMinimum
Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers [2003] OJ L031, 06/02/2003 18–25; Council
Regulation (EC) 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 Laying Down Certain Rules to Implement
Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 Concerning the Establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the Comparison of
Fingerprints for the Effective Application of the Dublin Convention [2000] OJ L062 05/03/2002
1–5; and Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving
Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Inﬂux of Displaced Persons and on Measures
Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing
the Consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212, 07/08/2001 12–23. The Commission is planning to
amend these pieces of legislation in 2009, see S Peers, ‘Statewatch analysis—the EU’s JHA
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The European Commission’s Green Paper on the Future Common
European Asylum System started the second phase of this process18 which is
due to end in 2012.19 The European Commission is driving for fuller
harmonization of both legislation and practice concerning asylum procedures,
protection status and asylum decisions.20 Thus, how this common legislation
is interpreted and applied by domestic courts is equally important. A com-
parative approach by judges therefore appears to be essential for the devel-
opment of a system that is not only common but is also coherent and built on
trust; these are necessary elements for any common system to work, as clearly
recognized by the European Commission in its Communication to the Council
and the European Parliament on ‘Strengthened Practical Cooperation—New
Structure, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision Making in
the Common European Asylum System’.21 For this to happen, a transnational
judicial dialogue or process of communication, resulting in the use of each
others’ jurisprudence, must exist between European judges. This article is
testing that: to what extent is the ground prepared for a common asylum
system, and if not, what are the obstacles that need to be addressed between
now and 2012?
It is worth noting here that the adoption of the new EC legislation on
asylum itself has already had some effect on the dialogue between refugee law
judges and the use of comparative jurisprudence. Indeed, the adoption of
new EC legislation has required the European Commission to consult with
different actors (eg academics and senior judges) to learn of the practice and
jurisprudence of the Member States. It has also forced the Member States to
reform their existing asylum legislation, and in doing so an important process
of inspiration by foreign practice and jurisprudence has taken place. Finally,
the adoption of new EC legislation requires the national courts to adapt to
what other Member States are doing in seeking to match their own approaches
with those adopted by other national courts and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) when dealing with similar issues.22 In this regard, information and best
practice are being exchanged through face-to-face meetings and networks,
such as the International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ). The
Agenda for 2009’, available at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/eu-sw-analysis-2009-jha-
agenda.pdf
18 Brussels, 06/06/2007, COM (2007) 301, ﬁnal. See also, the Hague Programme
‘Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union’ Presidency Conclusions,
Brussels, 4–5 November 2004.
19 Note that the original, formal deadline was 2010 but this has been postponed to 2012.
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, adopted at the Council of European Union Meeting
in Brussels, 16 Oct 2008, D/08/14.
20 Author’s interview with Zeta Georgiadou and Doede Ackers (policy ofﬁcers, European
Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, Directorate Immigration,
Asylum and Borders) Brussels, 27 June 2007.
21 Communication of 17 February 2006, COM (2006) 67, 3. See also L Potvin-Solis (n 4) 30.
22 H Storey ‘EU Refugee Qualiﬁcation Directive: A Brave New World?’ (2008) 20 (1)
International Journal of Refugee Law 1–49.
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IARLJ has its own database, set up by a German judge, Dr Paul Tiedemann, in
cooperation with the Europa¨ische EDV—Akademie des Rechts in Merzig,
Germany, which offers free access to international case law on asylum.
At present, the following languages are available: Dutch, English, German,
Finnish, French, Polish and Slovenian, and the database currently contains 190
decisions from ten countries. It is entirely dependent on voluntary submissions
and the goodwill of contacts (often judges) in different States.23
However, the next section shows that in the case of Britain and France,
judges rarely use each other’s decisions within the EU. The extent of this
problem is remarkable. Ideally, the ECJ should be able to help in this process
but, as things stand, its interpretative role is considerably limited under Article
68 EC Treaty which restricts possibilities of references to the ECJ to ‘a court
or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national
law’. For instance, since the coming into force of the Qualiﬁcation Directive
(Council Directive 2004/83/EC) on 10 October 2006, only three national
courts have made a preliminary ruling reference to the ECJ. In October 2007,
the highest administrative court (Raad van State) in the Netherlands sent a
question to the ECJ concerning the interpretation of article 15(c) (serious
harm) of the Directive.24 In April 2008, the German Fede´ral Administrative
Court (Bundersverwaltungsgericht) sent a preliminary question concerning
the interpretation of Article 11(1)(e) (cessation) of the Directive25. And in
January 2009, the Hungarian second instance administrative court (F}ova´rosi
Biro´sa´g) lodged a reference for preliminary reference to the ECJ concerning
the interpretation of Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive. Since the coming into
force of the Dublin Regulation (EC) 343/2003, only one question of in-
terpretation has been referred to the ECJ, by the Swedish Administrative Court
of Appeal (Kammarra¨tten I Stockholm) in January 2008.26 The Commission
Communication of 28 June 2006 proposes that article 234 EC should also be
applicable to the ﬁeld of asylum, immigration and visas.27 In the interim,
the urgent preliminary ruling procedure applicable to references concerning
the area of freedom, security and justice should help towards simplifying the
various stages of the proceedings before the ECJ in certain cases, but the
existing limitations regarding which court/tribunal can submit a reference
remain.28 It is therefore predicted that the interpretative role of the ECJ will
continue to be limited for a number of years. Indeed, even if and when article
68 EC is to be abolished and replaced with article 234 EC (eg with the
ratiﬁcation of the Treaty of Lisbon), it will take the ECJ some time to identify
foundational principles in this new area of law.29 Furthermore, the ECJ is not
23 Available at: http://www.iarlj.nl 24 Case C-465/07.
25 Case C-175-179/08 (pending).
26 Case C-19/08. 27 COM (2006) 346 ﬁnal.
28 Ofﬁcial Journal 8.3.2008, C-64/1-2.
29 C Chenevie`re ‘L’article 68 CE—Rapide survol d’un renvoi pre´judiciel mal compris’
(2004) 40 Cahiers de droit europe´en 5/6 567–590; and K Lenaerts ‘The Unity of European Law
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always able or willing to review facts, and yet in refugee cases, facts are often
key elements in a decision.30 Finally, it may be argued that the role of the ECJ
in this area of law is seriously compromised by the lack of experts in refugee
law at the ECJ and doubts are therefore expressed as to whether or not it will
be able to interpret the necessary Directives in accordance with international
law, in particular the Refugee Convention. The ECJ accepts the comparative
approach as a method of interpretation,31 but in practice the ECJ generally
does not refer in its judgments to national jurisprudence. It is left to the avocat
ge´ne´ral (or the Commission) to undertake any such comparative studies.32
A notable exception is Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission
(relating to conﬁdential treatment of contacts between lawyer and client),
where the ECJ itself requested that the parties provide extensive comparative
material on the existence and extent of a legal privilege of correspondence.33
In the new area of EC asylum law, the opinion of Advocate General Poiares
Maduro in Elgafaji,34 the ﬁrst to be delivered on the Qualiﬁcation Directive,
does very little to engage with existing asylum jurisprudence; instead the
Advocate General developed autonomous concepts in interpreting the
Qualiﬁcation Directive. And yet, much national jurisprudence exists already
in this area of law. Here there is scope for national courts to be more active in
providing the ECJ with national and comparative jurisprudence on asylum. In
any reference submitted to the ECJ (via articles 68 or 234 EC Treaty) on the
interpretation of EU law, the statement of the facts and the legal context set
out by the national court is central to the preliminary ruling procedure. It is
even recognised that this statement may be more important to the ECJ than the
explicit question that has been referred to the court.35
In sum, these particularities suggest that when the ECJ is going to enter into
a dialogue with national judges in this area of law, its role will not be as
effective as in other areas of integration. It has been suggested that EU-wide
and the Overload of the ECJ—The System of Preliminary Rulings Revisited’ in I Pernice,
J Kokott and C.Saunders (eds) The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative
Perspective, European Constitutional Law Network-Series Vol 6 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
Baden-Baden, 2006) 211–239, 216.
30 Lenaerts however points toward the ECJ’s developing tendency to ‘provide more ‘con-
crete’, as opposed to ‘abstract’, rulings warranting complex analysis of the facts, national legis-
lation and other aspects of the main action’; Lenaerts (n 4) 217.
31 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame [1996] ECR
I-1029, para.27. See generally Lenaerts, (n 4) 99–134.
32 Avocat ge´ne´raux have often referred to foreign jurisprudence and academic writings
(eg US) for inspiration in competition cases. See F Jacobs ‘Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-
Fertilisation of Legal Systems: the European Court of Justice’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law
Journal, 553. The Commission too has on occasion provided comparative materials upon request
by the ECJ, see Case 43/75 Defrenne v Socie´te´ anonyme belge de navigation ae´rienne Sabena.
33 T Koopmans ‘The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions’ (1991) 39
American Journal of Comparative Law 493–507.
34 Case C-465/07, opinion delivered on 9 September 2008.
35 D Chalmers and A Tomkins European Union Public Law (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2007) 278.
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guidelines based on national case law,36 which the ECJ can then rely on, may
be necessary to address the problem of divergent interpretation.37 This idea
is advocated by the UNHCR38 and is currently being discussed by members
of the IARLJ, European Chapter. The European Commission has recently
adopted a proposal for a Regulation to establish a European Asylum Support
Ofﬁce, in the form of an independent agency, in 2009, and aiming at providing
adequate support for practical cooperation activities between Member
States.39 It is felt that such support would serve ‘to improve the quality and
convergence of Member States’ decision-making, through, inter alia, ex-
change of good practice, joint training activities and the sharing of infor-
mation on countries from which asylum seekers originate’.40 This article
argues that national judges are key players in the establishment of a ‘common’
European asylum system, and activities based on trust and reciprocity between
national courts (such as using each others’ jurisprudence on asylum) must
occur for this system to work effectively.
III. TRANSNATIONAL ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE IN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH COURTS:
EMPIRICAL FOCUS
This section takes an empirical focus on Britain and France and answers three
questions: (1) What is the precise extent of the use of transnational asylum
jurisprudence by British and French judges in the EU? (2) When does it
happen? (3) Where does it happen?
Whilst not a primary focus, this section also considers questions of how and
why transnational asylum jurisprudence is used. Is it used because it is inter-
esting or persuasive?41 Is it used to prove or disprove factual propositions or to
seek normative guidance? Is it used to ﬁll a gap in the law or to conﬁrm that a
36 The terms ‘case law’ and ‘jurisprudence’ are used interchangeably throughout this article.
37 This ‘shared responsibility’ between the national courts and the ECJ is clearly recognized
by the ECJ itself in the area of human rights, eg Case C-117/01 KB v National Health
Service Pensions Agency (Judgment) [7 January 2004] and Case C-101/01 Lindqvist (Judgment)
[6 November 2003].
38 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum in the European Union: A Study of the
Implementation of the Qualiﬁcation Directive, November 2007.
39 Press Release, ‘Setting up of European Asylum Support Ofﬁce proposed by the
Commission’ IP/09/275, Brussels, 18 February 2009. Available at: http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/275&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en (accessed 28 February 2009).
40 Press Release ‘The EU moves toward the creation of a Support Ofﬁce in the ﬁeld of
asylum management’, IP/08/607, Brussels, 18 April 2008. Available at: http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/607&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en (accessed 22 April 2008). See also COM (2008) 360 ﬁnal, Commission’s
‘Policy Plan on Asylum’.
41 The search for ‘persuasive authority’ has been described as an attempt ‘to learn something
from a judge in a different country dealing with a similar problem’; Comments in the Harvard
Law Review (2005) 103, 167, 149. Also, J Bell French Legal Cultures (Butterworths, London,
2001) 8.
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proposed solution has worked elsewhere? Is it used to interpret a statute that
has its origins in the Refugee Convention or EC law (eg the Qualiﬁcation
Directive)? In cases where no jurisprudence exists from the International
Court of Justice or the ECJ, the national court will naturally aim towards
reaching a common meaning of the international treaty or the EC Directive.
Some of these purposes fall within rules of relevance others within judicial
discretion. In our context, refugee law, it is safe to say that judges have more
discretion when interpreting international treaties (EC Article 31(3) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) than when interpreting EU laws
(direct effect and indirect effect, and the evident role of the ECJ). This may
explain partly why we can see a slow increase in the pattern of transnational
references between certain EU countries since the adoption of EC legislation
on asylum.
A. Methodology
These questions were applied to a rigorous empirical analysis of the use of
foreign law in asylum cases in France and Britain. In the case of France, a
comprehensive survey was conducted by the Refugee Appeals Board’s Legal
Information Department on behalf of the author.42 This involved analysis of
all the decisions and preparatory documents (feuilles vertes) of the plenary
sessions of the Refugee Appeals Board (now the National Asylum Court)
since its ﬁrst hearing in 1993 until August 2006. The feuilles vertes are
working documents that contain a summary analysis of the legal instruments
and case law relevant to the case at hand. They are prepared by the Legal
Information Department of the Appeals Board (now the new Court), directly
under the supervision of its President (currently Mr Bernard) who decides
which questions to be considered and which appendices to include. Thus, it is
he who can require (and has required) foreign jurisprudence to be con-
sidered and added. The feuilles vertes are intended to be used by judges; on
occasion they may be communicated to the parties (and their representatives).
The empirical survey also involved analysis of all the relevant decisions
of the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) including the conclusions of the
Commissaire du Gouvernement which were available to the Refugee Appeals
Board but excluding those applications that were found to be manifestly un-
founded. In addition, a selection of decisions by the Refugee Appeals Board
sitting in ordinary session was also examined.43 In the case of Britain, a team
42 Note that the Refugee Appeals Board (Commission de recours des re´fugie´s) became the
National Asylum Court (Cour nationale du droit d’asile) following amendment of the CESEDA
(Code de l’entre´e et du se´jour des e´trangers et du droit d’asile) on 20 November 2007. See new
article L.733-1 f of the CESEDA.
43 Until 2001–2002, the annual collection of decisions of the Refugee Appeals Board
(created by the Legal Information Department) was based on all the decisions of the Board
(ie 6,000–12,000 per year). Since 2003, the Board (and now the new Court) has made over
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of researchers conducted a complete survey of the published decisions of all
the relevant courts in England and Scotland until January 2008. The decisions
of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, the Administrative Court, the High
Court, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Session (Scotland) and the House
of Lords that made reference to foreign asylum jurisprudence were selected
and analysed.
B. Empirical Findings: France
Empirical research shows that it is very rare for French senior asylum judges
to refer to foreign jurisprudence in the text of their decisions. With the ex-
ception of one case requiring the application of principles laid down in the
Dublin II Regulation and Schengen Convention,44 none of the decisions of the
National Asylum Court/Board or of the Council of State have made explicit
reference to foreign jurisprudence in the actual text of courts’ decisions.
Rather, if and when foreign material is being used, this takes place through
the use of supporting documents ( feuilles vertes) for the plenary sessions of
the National Asylum Court/Board which, on occasion, include an analysis of
foreign jurisprudence,45 or through the conclusions of the Commissaire du
Gouvernement who, as a member of the Council of State, gives her or his
opinion on the interpretation of important legal issues, an opinion which very
occasionally refers to foreign case law.46 On these rare occasions, foreign
jurisprudence has been used when it comes to interpreting certain contro-
versial provisions of the Refugee Convention, such as the meaning of social
group or the exclusion clause. The general assessment is that judges in France
base their arguments and reasoning mostly on French sources of law, includ-
ing international and European law which is binding on the French courts.
However, a recent trend is starting to show towards an increase in trans-
national references, particularly in the context of new legal concepts that
spring from the new EU Directives. For instance, the Refugee Appeal Board
gave serious consideration to foreign jurisprudence when, in 2003, it drafted
an internal document aimed at implementing Council Directive 2004/83/EC
(namely, the Qualiﬁcation Directive). This document, largely inspired by
40,000 decisions per year, of which around 2,000 decisions are selected each year for the col-
lection.
44 CRR (Commission de recours des re´fugie´s), SR (sections re´unies), 23 February 2001,
application no. 351244, Keklicekpinari.
45 Eleven such cases were found: CRR, SR, 7 November 2001, applications 361050 and
373077, Sissoko; CRR, SR, 7 December 2001, appl 368138, Soumah; CRR, SR, 9 January 2003,
appl 362645, Altun; CRR, SR, 28 February 2003, appls 404302 and 404411, Mlles Wang; CRR,
SR, 17 October 2003, appl 423904, Mlle M; CRR, SR, 25 June 2004, appl 403498, Mme Kofﬁ
Amani; CRR, SR, 15 October 2004, appl 444000, Nazia; CRR, SR, 4 March 2005, appl 489014,
Mlle Tas; CRR, SR, 29 July 2005, appl 519803, Mlle Tabe.
46 See, Conclusions by Martine Denis-Linton inMme Agyepong (Conseil d’Etat, 2 December
1994, application 112842) and Conclusions by Jean-Denis Combrexelle in Ourbih (Conseil
d’Etat, 23 June 1997, application 171858).
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foreign jurisprudence, is important in providing new directions in the
interpretation of new concepts in the Directive, such as lack of protection by
the State of origin, internal relocation, and subsidiary protection. It also con-
ﬁrms that the new EC Directives on asylum require judges to learn more about
their neighbouring countries’ jurisprudence.
C. Empirical Findings: Britain
In Britain, the search for an authority (or subsequent State practice)47 is an
important component of a court’s decision. To this end, the British courts
(including the Scottish Court of Session) have often explicitly referred to
common law jurisprudence in asylum cases, in particular to decisions from
Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the USA when interpreting certain pro-
visions of the Refugee Convention.48 They have also increasingly relied upon
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the European Court of Human
Rights,49 as well as drawn on distinguished academic writing.50 However,
judges only rarely refer to jurisprudence from other EU Member States.51
When such transnational reference happens, it takes place mostly in the con-
text of the application of the Dublin II Regulation (that is, when considering
the likely conduct of a court in a third country), or when interpreting certain
controversial provisions of the Refugee Convention (such as, persecution
by non-state agents, protection of the country of nationality or article 1D-
refugees receiving United Nations protection and assistance). Other foreign
material, such as foreign statutes or practice, is also occasionally being re-
ferred to in the context of the application of the Dublin Regulation.52 In such
cases, the use of foreign law is made quite openly by judges themselves in the
47 Article 31(3)(b), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
48 eg Lord Bingham’s opinion in Sepet v SSHD [2003] 1 WLR 856 (HL) and in Januzi and
Hamid v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 (HL) and Lord Steyn’s opinion in Islam v SSHD and R v IAT and
another, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (25 March 1999).
49 eg R (Razgar) v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27 (HL), R (Limbuela) v SSHD, R (Tesema) v same,
R(Adam) v same [2005] (HL) (3 November 2005) Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-
Arabiya AS Saudiya [2006] 26 (HL) and A et al Abu Rideh and Ajouaou v SSHD [2004] CA 71
(HL).
50 In particular the work of Professors G S Goodwin-Gill and J C Hathaway, eg SSHD v K
(FC) and Fornah (FC) v SSHD [2006] 46 (HL); Horvath v SSHD [2000] INLR 15 (HL); and Islam
v SSHD [1999] 2 WLR 1015 and R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Shah [1999] 2 AC 629
(HL).
51 Seven such instances were found, three at the House of Lords, one at the Court of Appeal
and three at the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. See Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex p Thangarasa & Yogathas, [2002] 36 HL; R ex p Zeqiri v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2002] (HL); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Adan,
and R v SSHD, ex p Aitseguer [2001] 2 WLR 143 (HL); and EB (Ethiopia) [2007] EWCA Civ
809; RD (Algeria) [2007] UKAIT 00066; ST v SSHD, [2005] UKIAT 00006; Fadil Dyli v SSHD,
[2000] UKIAT 00001. No instances were found at the Scottish Court of Session.
52 See, for instance, Sepet and Bulbul v SSHD [2003] 1 WLR 856 (HL) Re B (FC), R v Special
Adjudicator ex parte Hoxha [2005] (HL)Islam v SSHD [1999] 2 WLR 1015 and R v Immigration
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actual text of the decisions of the courts. What is certain is that foreign law is
only being used at a senior level, ie that of appeal and beyond, not at the initial
ﬁrst-instance level in the decision-making process. It also appears from a
reading of the relevant cases that British judges are using foreign law because
it is interesting; they are curious about ﬁnding out how other judges have
responded when faced with a similar issue. In such cases, the aim is ‘less to
borrow than to beneﬁt from comparative deliberation’.53 In most cases where
foreign law is being discussed, such an exercise also appears to lend legit-
imacy to the values of judges when exercising their judicial functions, par-
ticularly in instances where the law is ambiguous.54 Thus, recourse to foreign
law in the British courts helps reinforce legitimacy and ‘guides, the exercise of
judicial discretion’.55 The use of foreign law in Britain, therefore, seems to be
about the protection of judges themselves in that it provides a form of re-
assurance and checks on their own power.56 This is best illustrated with cases
where deviations between foreign and domestic approaches were found. In
such cases, British judges consider it important to distinguish judgments of
foreign courts if these go against the conclusion that they intend to reach.57
Such instances clearly show that British judges are actively engaged in a
dialogue with other judges, just not judges from continental Europe, and that
they are using foreign law as persuasive authority.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE AND THE BRITISH AND FRENCH JUDGES:
JURISPRUDENTIAL QUESTION
This section considers a jurisprudential question: why transnational referenc-
ing does or does not happen. Two basic accounts are suggested: a rational
account and a cultural account.
A. Rational Account
The rational account focuses on language, time constraints and access, and
training, and it looks at the extent to which these constitute obstacles to the
Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL), and R v SSHD, ex p Adan
[1999] INLR 362 (HL).
53 A-M Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004) 75.
54 W Lacey ‘Judicial Discretion and Human Rights: Expanding the Role of International Law
in the Domestic Sphere’ (2004) Melbourne Journal of International Law 108–132, 113.
55 ibid 108–132, 114.
56 Cherie Booth, remarks at a one-day conference at the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law: ‘European Inﬂuences on Public Law: 5 years of the HRA 1998 in English Law
and Recent Developments in France’ October 2005. See also, J Bell Judiciaries within Europe—
A Comparative Review (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 9–10.
57 eg Lord Hope in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489,
discussing Canadian jurisprudence on the meaning of ‘persecution’ and sufﬁcient ‘protection’ in
article 1 A(2) of the Refugee Convention.
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volume and direction of the dialogue between judges in France and in
Britain.58 The basic premise is that the extent of such obstacles has a causal
impact on the volume of dialogue and also on its direction. This explanation is
said to be rational because it is based on opportunity cost, namely, the balance
between the beneﬁts of referring to foreign law and the costs that such an
exercise entails.59
1. Language
Analysis of the relevant case law in France shows that where foreign law is
used, decisions, legislation and practice from countries as diverse as Germany,
the USA, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and Belgium have oc-
casionally been used at the National Asylum Court and the Council of State
without any obvious preference for French-speaking countries. This suggests
that language does not constitute a major obstacle to an exchange in juris-
prudence between France and other EU Member States. At ﬁrst sight, the
situation appears different in Britain, where the courts commonly refer to
jurisprudence from other Commonwealth countries but hardly ever make
reference to decisions from non-English-speaking countries. However, the
superior courts of some EU countries translate their key decisions into
English. This is the case in France, where since 2004 summaries (more rarely
the full text) of important decisions of the National Asylum Court and of the
Council of State are translated into English. It would seem therefore that
language is not a barrier per se to transnational European legal dialogue in
refugee law.60 Hence, other obstacles need to be considered.
2. Time constraints and access
It is evident that ﬁrst-instance decision-makers in France are not adequately
equipped to take advantage of foreign law. The normal time limit for a de-
cision by the OFPRA (Ofﬁce franc¸ais de protection des re´fugie´s et apatrides)
is two months, but it can be reduced to 15 days in the case of a priority
procedure or 96 hours when the asylum-seeker is placed in administrative
58 Other ‘rational’ explanations have been put forward to account for the lack of trafﬁc be-
tween foreign judges, such as institutional capacity and habit.
59 This rational account is based on regime theory which seeks to explain co-operation
between actors in world politics. See A Hansenclever, P Mayer and V Rittberger, Theories of
International Regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997) 23–82; A Stein, ‘Coordi-
nation and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, in SD Krasner (ed), International
Regimes (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983), 115–140; and D Snidal, ‘Coordination Versus
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes’ (1985) 79
American Political Science Review 923–942.
60 In addition to language barrier, lack of knowledge of foreign legal systems may be a further
inhibiting factor in the use of foreign jurisprudence in that system.
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detention.61 In this context, the time put aside by each ofﬁcer for researching
the facts, analysing the applicant’s ﬁle, and reﬂecting upon each case, is ex-
tremely short.62 As a judicial authority, the National Asylum Court can also
issue a ruling without being bound by a time limit but, given the sheer number
of asylum appeals, the Court has no choice but to rule promptly.63 In Britain,
the New Asylum Model (introduced on 5 March 2007) requires asylum cases
to be concluded within six months. Asylum-seekers’ interviews take place six
days after initial screening. Fast-track cases (namely, ‘manifestly unfounded’
or ‘late and opportunistic’) are decided within 11 days; all other decisions are
made within one month. As a result, judges in the lower courts have very little
time to undertake any research of foreign case law. Concerning access to
decisions, the full text of most cases decided by the British courts is published
and (easily) accessible to the public,64 but this is not the case in all European
countries (for instance, Ireland), therefore making it difﬁcult for a British
judge to access this foreign case law. France too makes most of its decisions
available to the public65—but as discussed in sub-section B below these de-
cisions are extremely short and reveal little. However, this is not the case of
the supporting documents intended for the plenary sessions of the National
Asylum Court or of the conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at
the Council of State. In sum, difﬁculty in accessing other countries’ decisions,
coupled with time constraints, appear to be a considerable barrier to a trans-
national judicial dialogue in refugee law.66
3. Training
The French National Asylum Court (previously the Refugee Appeals Board)
is an administrative tribunal,67 whose ordinary members (or judges) are not
required to be lawyers; they do not necessarily know French law, and less so
(comparative) refugee law or human rights.68 The pre´sidents des formations
61 Articles R 723-2 and R 723-3 of the CESEDA.
62 2.7 dossiers per day at the OFPRA; around 2 dossiers per day per rapporteur at the Refugee
Appeal Board. J Valluy, ‘La ﬁction juridique de l’asile’ (December 2004) Plein Droit 63.
63 The average time for ruling on an asylum appeal was approximately 10.3 months at
the Board in 2006. See the Activity Report 2006 of the Refugee Appeals Board, available at:
http://www.commission-refugies.fr/presentation_4/actualites_5/rapport_activite_2006_2142.html,
especially 21–22. 64 Available at http://www.bailii.org/
65 Available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
66 This ﬁnding is echoed in Gabor Gyulai’s report on ‘Country Information in Asylum
Procedures—Quality as a Legal Requirement in the EU’ (n 7) 12, with regard to country infor-
mation.
67 Act of 25 July 1952, amended by the Act of 10 December 2003. See also article L.731-1
CESEDA and Decree of 14 August 2004.
68 Since 2004, each section ( formation) of the National Asylum Court is composed of three
judges (including the pre´sident de formation): one from the civil law branch, one from the ad-
ministrative law branch, and one representing the UNHCR.
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(chairs of sections), who exceed 100 in number,69 and rapporteurs70 have
nonetheless such a background, but again not speciﬁcally in comparative
refugee law. A law background is not a prerequisite to being appointed to the
Council of State, though its members are typically top graduates of the ENA
(Ecole nationale d’administration), the most well-known national institution
training the highest French civil servants. On occasion, members of the
Council of State can be from another background, such as university pro-
fessors.71 Thus, reference to foreign (comparative) jurisprudence in the
French courts remains traditionally driven by the intellectual curiosity of some
judges. The situation is similar in Britain where, despite a greater emphasis on
judicial training in contrast to the long tradition of ‘learning on the job’,72 such
training does not include the study of comparative systems of law. Therefore,
it remains the case that elements of comparative law and jurisprudence are
only used by British judges when put forward by counsel and/or academics, or
when judges themselves, as individuals, are intellectually curious about how it
is done elsewhere. However, the establishment of a common European asylum
system has created the necessity for training in new EC laws on asylum;
this training is being provided by individual members of the International
Association of Refugee Law Judges and the European Commission (and in
future by the new European Asylum Support Ofﬁce). An ‘invisible trafﬁc’ of
legal ideas and exchange of key principles and good practice between judges
of the EU Member States is therefore happening through such training73 but,
as noted in section III, so far such trafﬁc has had little impact on the use of
transnational jurisprudence.
B. Cultural Account
In contrast to the rational account, the cultural account emphasises social
perceptions about the (non-)usefulness of foreign decisions resulting in default
rejection of foreign jurisprudence. These social perceptions (for example, a
decision is not worth considering) are produced by culture and would create
an exaggerated sense of the barriers to dialogue. It is here that one ﬁnds other
reasons why so little trafﬁc of legal ideas takes place between EU countries.
69 All the pre´sidents des formations are appointed from the administrative or ﬁnancial branch
of the judiciary (that is, the Council of State, the Appeal Administrative Tribunal or the
Administrative Tribunals, or the National (and Regional) Audit Ofﬁce(s), respectively); they
therefore have a general law background.
70 Rapporteurs are granted primary responsibility for preparing cases (that is, follow the
enquiry and prepare a draft decision for the National Asylum Court to be examined at the time of
decision). Strictly speaking not all of them are lawyers but they must at least have done a training
course in refugee law.
71 For more details on the background of members of the Council of State, read article
L 133–1 f of the code of administrative justice, and J Bell, Judiciaries within Europe (n 57)
44–107. 72 ibid 319.
73 Thanks to Hugo Storey for pointing this out.
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For the purpose of this article, and drawing upon scholarship on legal culture
and comparative law,74 three elements are considered.
First is the style of judgments, as an indication of legal culture. In particular,
is there evidence that style ‘may set different systems apart’75 and be used
to explain ‘more deeply rooted activities’,76 in the context of refugee law?
The second element is the conceptual legal framework within which the
judge operates, as an indication of an open versus a closed judicial mentality.
Indeed, comparative law scholarship suggests that judicial mentality can
constitute an important obstacle to real harmonization between civilian law-
yers and common lawyers, even on the basis of common texts.77 The ﬁnal
element is the domestic dynamic surrounding asylum cases, as an indication
of the role of civil society in this system of legal reasoning. In particular, is
there evidence of practising lawyers or other actors such as NGOs, human
rights associations or academics, in fact using other EU countries’ jurispru-
dence? The role played by formal or informal contacts between judiciaries,
such as the IARLJ, must also be acknowledged here, to the extent that such
contacts contribute to an ‘invisible trafﬁc’ of legal ideas.
4. Style of judgments
Traditionally, judgments of the French superior courts are concise to the point
of hiding any apparent legal reasoning.78 In the area of refugee law, this is
particularly true of the decisions of the National Asylum Court/Board. Some
of these decisions have been described (perhaps unfairly considering the sheer
volume of cases considered by the Court/Board) as consisting of merely a
‘concise summary of the asylum-seeker’s story, followed by a purely stereo-
typical sentence indicating a positive or negative conclusion’.79 As a result,
74 BS Markesinis and J Fedtke, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (n 5) 11–167; BS Markesinis and
J Fedtke; Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law (n 5); BS Markesinis ‘A Matter of Style’ (n 5) 607–
628; BS Markesinis, ‘Judge, Jurist and the Study and Use of Foreign Law’ (n 5) 622–635; J Bell
(n 41) Bell (n 57); C Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’
(2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 214–245; M Andenas and D Fairgrieve,
‘Introduction: Finding a Common Language for Open Legal Systems’ in Comparative Law
Before the Courts (n 5) xxvii; O Dutheillet de Lamothe, ‘Constitutional Court Judges’
Roundtable’ (2005) 550 International Journal of Constitutional Law; F Liche`re, Le dialogue entre
les juges europe´ens et nationaux: incantation or re´alite´.
75 Markesinis, ‘Judge, Jurist and the Study and Use of Foreign Law’ (n 5) 607.
76 Bell (n 41) 17 and Markesinis, ‘A Matter of Style’ (n 5) 607, respectively.
77 Legrand (n 5) 60–61. Markesinis and Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law (n 5) 173–
218.
78 Bell (n 57) 74. One exception might be Socie´te´ Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres,
Conseil d’Etat Assemble´e, 8 February 2007, appl 287110, an environmental law case in which the
Council of State adopted an unusually long conside´rant de principe; see M-P Granger, ‘France is
“Already” Back in Europe: The Europeanization of French Courts and the Inﬂuence of France in
the EU’ (2008) 14 European Public Law 335, 367.
79 J Valluy ‘La ﬁction juridique de l’asile’ (December 2004) Plein Droit 63 (translation by the
author).
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and in such a context, no mention of foreign law should appear in the text
itself of a decision, unless this is expressly provided by statute or the
Constitution. Thus, French administrative courts may be required to quote
decisions of the ECJ or may choose to refer to decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights. And there are plenty of examples by now where the Council
of State has referred to the jurisprudence or methods of interpretation of these
two courts, thereby becoming familiar with the method of comparative law.80
However, as seen above, citing or referring to foreign law from another
national jurisdiction remains rare in French administrative courts.81
In Britain, it is the ‘use of language’ that gives the common law judgment
‘its distinctive edge’.82 The broad use of language makes it particularly ‘in-
formative of what is really going through a judge’s mind when he is trying a
case’,83 and in particular of the motives behind judges’ decisions to consider
foreign law.84 Such a characteristic makes the common law judgment highly
‘suitable for export’.85 It can thus be inferred that the English judgment—
alongside the English language—will necessarily constitute an important
element that will shape the European legal culture in the area of asylum and
refugee law.86 But the judgments from the British courts have other charac-
teristics. In particular, it allows judges and representatives of the parties to
refer to foreign judgments. To this end, the British courts have often referred
to judgments of other Commonwealth countries which ﬁt the same style. They
have also increasingly relied upon the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court,
particularly in those cases directly involving provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights (where section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998
requires them to take that case law into account),87 in spite of the more con-
densed and even opaque tradition of Strasbourg reasoning.88
80 R Errera ‘The Use of Comparative Law Before the French Administrative Law Courts’, in
Canivet et al (eds) (n 5) 161; and G Canivet, ‘The Use of Comparative Law Before the French
Private Law Courts’ in Canivet et al (n 5) 189.
81 See also, Errera ibid 153–163.
82 BS Markesinis (n 5) 608. 83 ibid 610.
84 These may be of three kinds: to help shape their own law, to help towards a better under-
standing of the problem to be solved, or ‘as a mere ‘padding’ for a judgment already reached on
other grounds’ BS Markesinis and J Fedtke, ‘The Judge as a Comparatist’ (n 5) 25–26. See also,
C McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’ (n 5) 499, 523: who noted that the purpose of
using foreign law may be manifold: it may be to ﬁll a gap in the law, to interpret domestic law
provisions, or to be used as a ‘security blanket’—to be seen to be doing a good job.
85 Markesinis, ‘Judge, Jurist and the Study and Use of Foreign Law’ (n 5) 610.
86 For other elements of strong British inﬂuence, see Granger (n 79) 344 and 346.
87 R [on the application of Razgar] v SSHD [2004] 3 WLR 58 (HL) (article 8 ECHR—mental
health); A (FC) and others (FC) v SSHD and X (FC) v SSHD, [2004] 56 (HL) (detention of
suspected terrorists).
88 eg compare the House of Lords decision in R on the application of Dianne Pretty v
Director of Public Prosecutions and SSHD [18 October 2001] (HL) with the reasoning in the
European Court of Human Rights’ judgment (Pretty v United Kingdom) (Judgment) [29 April
2002] appl 2346/02; the former is more ﬂuid and full.
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5. Conceptual legal framework within which the judge operates
It is a characteristic of the French legal system that a refugee law judge is
only allowed to operate within strict legislative boundaries. This conceptual
framework includes (a) the 1958 Constitution (which in its Preamble refers
to the right of asylum); (b) international treaties (particularly the Refugee
Convention on Human Rights) and EC law (particularly the Qualiﬁcation and
Procedure Directives) as binding sources of law and (c) domestic legislation
(such as, the Act of 1952 and the new Code de l’entre´e et du se´jour des
e´trangers et du droit d’asile CESEDA 2003).89 Apart from this legal frame-
work, the French judge also looks at existing jurisprudence, and will apply
French jurisprudence as well as the jurisprudence from the European Court of
Human Rights, but without actually citing it in the text of decisions. French
jurisprudence plays a particularly important role in the application and inter-
pretation of the refugee deﬁnition, but purely as a basis of intellectual refer-
ence, not as a binding source of law. There is indeed no rule of precedent in
France, and this applies to the National Asylum Court as well as the Council
of State. Judges aim to follow a coherent line of jurisprudence, but that is all.90
Previous case law is seen as an example, not more than that; therefore a judge
at the National Asylum Court will never base his or her case on a previous
decision, be it French or foreign. And when judges apply previous jurispru-
dence, they do not cite it.91 Foreign law as a source of inspiration, therefore, is
still some distance away.92 In sum, it would be unseemly for a French judge to
refer to foreign jurisprudence, except that of the ECJ which is binding on
French courts, and that of the Strasbourg Court as a source of ECHR law,
unless one has a particular intellectual curiosity towards foreign law. In this
regard, the current President of the National Asylum Court, Mr Bernard, and
his predecessor, Mr Massot, both keen comparative lawyers, have been
moving things forwards in that direction.
Unlike France, the conceptual framework within which a British judge
operates can be described as ﬂexible. Much reference is made by British
judges to sources of law that are not necessarily strictly binding on the British
courts. To take two examples, in the case of Fornah and K (FC) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department, the ﬁve Lords and Baroness made plenty of
references to UNHCR guidelines, academic writing, and foreign authority
89 The French judge has also been active in creating law in the area of asylum on quite a wide
scale through the concept of general principles of law. See F Tiberghien, ‘La jurisprudence du
Conseil d’Etat sur la Convention de Gene`ve du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des re´fugie´s’ in La
Convention de Gene`ve du 28 juillet 1951 realtive au statut des re´fugie´s 50 ans apre`s: Bilan et
perspectives V Chetail (ed) (Bruylant, Brussels, 2001) 289, 317–320; and L Jeannin,
M Meneghini, C Pauti, and R Poupet, Le Droit d’Asile en Europe—Etude compare´e (Paris,
L’Harmattan, 1999) 144–145.
90 Author’s interview with Franc¸ois Bernard (President of the National Asylum Court) Paris,
20 June 2006. 91 ibid.
92 Author’s interview with Vera Zederman (National Asylum Court) Paris, 20 June 2006.
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from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US as valuable authority.93
In the case of R v SSHD, ex p Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer, Laws LJ held:
‘While the Handbook is not by any means itself a source of law, many sig-
natory States have accepted the guidance which on their behalf the UNHCR
was asked to provide, and in those circumstances it constitutes in our judg-
ment, good evidence of what has come to be international practice within art
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention’.94 Indeed, British judges have long been
preoccupied with searching and reaching ‘international consensus’ or ‘broad
consensus’ on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, whether through
foreign authority or academic writers.95 And in doing so, they have referred
extensively to the jurisprudence of the common law countries with which they
have long-established reciprocal relations that are conducive to dialogue.
These relations have also been reinforced by the belief that some European
countries interpret the Refugee Convention less ﬂexibly than Britain. This
would be the case of Sweden, for instance, where the Aliens Appeals Board
has been criticized for being too strict and too politicized, or of France and
Germany which for many years followed a restrictive approach to the in-
terpretation of ‘persecution’ in article 1A(2) Refugee Convention.
6. Domestic dynamic surrounding asylum cases
Refugee law as a specialist subject is not taught in French universities, and one
can ﬁnd very few academic books on the subject, and no specialized academic
journal of refugee law. The Dictionnaire Permanent, Droit des Etrangers
(Editions Legislatives) is what it says it is, a dictionary that is regularly
updated and which discusses legislation and case law relating to asylum
and refugees, by themes. Of the few books on the subject, less than a handful
show an inclination towards comparative foreign law. One such example is
D Alland and C Teitgen-Colly, Traite´ du droit d’asile (PUF, 2002), which in
its ﬁrst part offers a valuable account of the various conceptions of the right
of asylum: international, European (including comparative national laws) as
well as French.96 One might infer from this apparent disinterest in refugee
law that academics have little engagement in the asylum decision-making
process in France. However, the inﬂuence of doctrinal legal writing exists
and is both formal and informal. Formally, the inﬂuence of academic writing
can be seen at the Council of State in the conclusions of the Commissaire du
Gouvernement. At the National Asylum Court, such inﬂuence takes place
93 House of Lords, judgment of 18 October 2006 [2006] UKHL 46.
94 [1999] Imm AR 521. See further M Symes and P Jorro, Asylum Law & Practice
(Butterworths, Lexis Nexis UK, 2003) 7–12.
95 Lord Lloyd Berwick’s opinion in R v SSHD, ex parte Adan, [1999] INLR 362 (HL). See
also, Lord Millet in Islam v SSHD [1999] 2 WLR 1015 (HL) and R v Immigration Appeal
Tribunal and Another, ex p Shah [1999] 2 AC (HL) paras 19–20; and Sepet v SSHD [2003] UKHL
15 (HL) (Lord Bingham). 96 See also L Jeannin et al (n 90).
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most notably when an academic professor is elected to represent the UNHCR
and therefore sits at the Court sessions and is actively involved in decision-
making. This is the case presently of Professor Catherine Teitgen-Colly.
Informally also, doctrinal legal writing can be inﬂuential through numerous
contacts between academics and judges. Academics may on occasion be
consulted by avocats (especially at the Council of State) when considering
difﬁcult legal issues or may indeed be employed in their ofﬁces.97 The role of
French associations and some international non-governmental organizations
(INGOs) is also increasing.98 Generally speaking, immigrants and refugees
tend to rely more on national associations than INGOs (such as Amnesty
International and the Fe´de´ration internationale des droits de l’homme or
FIDH) because their role is more focused on these persons’ rights. One of the
most specialized associations in the legal protection of aliens’ rights is the
Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigre´s (GISTI—Information and
Support Group for Immigrants).99 Since its creation in the early 1970s, GISTI
has brought many cases before administrative judges, some of which have
been successful.100 One of its greatest successes is the 1978 GISTI case (8
December 1978) in which the Council of State recognized the principle of a
‘normal family life’ as a general principle of law. GISTI also provides legal
advice on procedure to immigrants and sometimes helps in the drafting of
asylum claims. GISTI has recently started to pay attention to foreign juris-
prudence. For instance, in a recent case before the Paris Administrative
Tribunal, a member of the GISTI relied on a decision of the English High
Court101 in seeking to prevent the expulsion of an asylum-seeker.102 This
points to a more general trend, namely a slight but noticeable increase in the
use of foreign jurisprudence by national associations working on behalf of
asylum-seekers. Forum re´fugie´s offers another illustration of this trend to-
wards a greater use of foreign jurisprudence in French cases.103
In Britain, refugee law as a specialized subject has caught the attention of
academics for many years and it has been taught for over a decade in some
97 Bell (n 57) 81, 86.
98 See generally, G Breton-Le Goff ‘Mondialisation et de´mocratie: e´valuation de la partici-
pation normative des OING a` la gouvernance’, Universite´ de Que´bec a` Montre´al sur les fonde-
ments philosophiques de la justice et de la socie´te´ de´mocratique, October 2001.
99 Other well-known associations or support groups include CIMADE (Comite´ Inter-
Mouvements Aupre`s des Evacue´s), ANAFE (Association nationale d’assistance aux frontie`res
pour les e´trangers) and Forum re´fugie´s.
100 The Council of State has ruled in more than 40 cases where the GISTI was a claimant, alone
or with other associations, eg Conseil d’Etat, 12 June 2006, appl 282275. I thank Janine Silga for
this point.
101 Javad Nasseri v The Secretary of State of the Home Department, [2007] EWHC 1548
(Admin), [2009] 2 WLR 523.
102 Tribunal Administratif de Paris, 9 August 2007, Mohammad Afzali, No. 0712180/9/1.
103 A Ouareff, ‘La France doit cesser le transfert de demandeurs d’asile sous Dublin vers la
Gre`ce’, expert note n. 6/2008, April 2008. Available at: http://www.forumrefugies.org/FR06-
dublin%20transfert_da_vers_grece.pdf (28. 04.2008).
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universities. Research and teaching centres have been built around the subject,
and Britain is home to two specialized academic journals on the topic
(namely, the Journal of International Refugee Law and the Journal of Refugee
Studies) both published by Oxford University Press.104 In addition, academic
writing is often referred to by judges.105 For instance, in R v Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex p Adan, Lord Lloyd noted that in cases where no
precedents exist, the works of academic writers ‘provide the best hope of
reaching international consensus on the meaning of the Convention’.106 In T v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lord Mustill observed that in the
area of public international law ‘the writings of scholars have always exerted
great authority’.107 And in Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-
Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), albeit not an asylum case,
Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffmann dismissed relevant foreign case law
(mainly put forward by representatives of the parties) by relying on critical
comments made by distinguished academics.108 So, British judges are fre-
quently engaged in a dialogue with academics.109 Legal interventions by
IGOs (such as UNHCR) and INGOs (such as Amnesty International) are also
part of the overall picture at least in the senior courts.110 The role of NGOs is
also particularly strong. Among the different kinds of NGOs dealing with
refugees and asylum issues, those with a focus on legal representation play a
signiﬁcant role in the asylum determination process. In this regard, the role of
the Refugee Legal Centre (RLC) is particularly interesting because of its
strong focus on case work. The RLC was founded in 1992 as a centre for the
provision of (free) quality legal representation for asylum-seekers from the
very ﬁrst initial stage of the asylum determination process up to the Court of
Appeal and House of Lords stage.111 One team of case-workers specializes in
the initial phase of the asylum determination process, another team does the
appeal work at the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, while a third team deals
with strategic litigation in the High Court, Court of Appeal and House of
104 See also the more practitioner-orientated Tolley’s Immigration, Asylum and Nationality
Law Journal.
105 The works of Professors GS Goodwin-Gill and JC Hathaway have been particularly in-
ﬂuential in several House of Lords’ judgments, as well as abroad.
106 [1998] Imm AR 338; [1998] INLR 325. 107 [1996] Imm AR 443.
108 House of Lords, judgment of 14 June 2006, paras 22 and 63.
109 To read more widely on the relationship between judges and academics, see Bell (n 57)
326–329.
110 eg Fornah and K(FC) v SSHD and UNHCR (Intervener), (House of Lords, judgment of 18
October 2006) [and Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the Nigerian Federal High Court reviewing
refugee status granted to Charles Taylor (23 September 2004 available through REFWORLD)].
111 RLC also contributes to the public debate on asylum policy and procedures at the national
and European level. It is an independent, not-for-proﬁt organisation, and a registered charity. The
quality of its work is subject to the regulations of the Legal Services Commission and the Ofﬁce of
the Immigration Services Commissioner. More speciﬁcally, it is funded by a contract with the
Legal Services Commission on the basis of a merit test (that is, a case must be found to have more
than 50 per cent of chances of success for the RLC to be allowed to represent the applicant).
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Lords.112 It is within these last two teams that great interest lies in what is
occurring in other countries to ensure such cutting-edge jurisprudence is
produced in the UK. In this context, RLC keeps track of other countries’
interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and now of the Qualiﬁcation
Directive. Another issue on which foreign jurisprudence is proving useful in
informing the refugee status determination process is that of safe third coun-
tries.113 It has been observed that neighbouring States are of particular con-
cern and that it is particularly important to know about their jurisprudence in
the context of the new Directives (especially the Qualiﬁcation Directive).114
In sum, academics and NGOS are very much involved in asylum cases in
Britain. They too sometimes look at the jurisprudence of other European
countries. So far such references appear to be mostly driven by the
Qualiﬁcation Directive.
V. CONCLUSION
French and British judges rarely use each others’ jurisprudence, or that of
other EU countries, when making decisions on asylum. An examination of
asylum case law in France up to 2006 reveals that the Refugee Appeals Board
(now the National Asylum Court) only made explicit reference to such juris-
prudence in one decision in 2001. However, the jurisprudence of other EU
countries is cited in the supporting documents of a dozen cases of the Board/
Court, and in two conclusions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement of the
Council of State, over this period. An examination of asylum case law in
Britain up to 2007 reveals seven instances where judges have made explicit
reference to the jurisprudence of other EU countries in their decisions: in three
cases before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, one before the Court of
Appeal, and three before the House of Lords. There is also evidence of some
use of other elements of foreign law (eg legislation and administrative prac-
tice) by British and French courts in asylum cases. It should be noted that
anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be a fair amount of ‘invisible
trafﬁc’ in transnational use of jurisprudence through informal contacts and
networks. We should also note that the trend (in so far as a trend may be
inferred from so few cases) in both countries is towards increasing use in
asylum cases of jurisprudence from other EU countries.
The rational account only gets us so far in explaining the lack of a trans-
national European legal dialogue in French and British asylum jurisprudence.
Language is not such a major obstacle. French courts, in so far as they refer to
foreign law, do not show a particular preference for the jurisprudence of other
112 R (Bagdanavicius) v SSHD [2005] 2 WLR 1309 (HL), [2005] 1 All ER 263 (HL).
113 Eg Javad Nasseri v SSHD [2008] 2 WLR 523; see now the judgment of the House of Lords
[2009] UKHL 23 [2007] EWHC 1548 (Admin).
114 Author’s interview with Nick Oakeshott (Head of Legal Services, Refugee Legal Centre,
London, 19 July 2007).
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French-speaking countries. Whilst there is a preference among British courts
for Commonwealth case law, British courts have for a number of years had
access to English translations of key decisions by non-English speaking for-
eign courts. Time constraints are a problem at the level of ﬁrst appeal. French
and British tribunals often have a matter of days, if not hours, before con-
sidering an asylum claim in court, leaving no time to consider foreign law.
However, the higher courts in both countries do not operate under such time
restrictions. Both France and Britain provide good public access to refugee
case law, but access is less good in many other parts of the EU, thus restricting
the ability of French and British judges easily to get a hold of the asylum
jurisprudence in these countries. In both France and Britain, there is little
attention to foreign law in the training of refugee law judges.
The cultural account completes the picture. More to the point, culture pre-
sents a more profound barrier in both cases to the use of foreign jurisprudence
by refugee judges. It is notoriously difﬁcult to recover culture and trace its
causal impact on social outcomes (in this case, use and disuse of foreign
law).115 Hence, this article has adopted a three-step approach. The ﬁrst step
was to assess the extent to which the style of legal reasoning in France and
Britain provide possibilities for inclusion of foreign jurisprudence. Here there
is indeed a stark contrast between the stripped-down, almost mechanical,
reasoning of French courts, and the expansive judgments of British courts: the
latter provide far more possibility for reference to a variety of sources,
whereas in the former there is no expectation (let alone space) for this. The
second step was to explore the mentality of judiciaries in both States, in par-
ticular, in terms of the willingness to draw on foreign jurisprudence in decid-
ing asylum cases. Here again there is a sharp contrast between French courts
which only consider binding sources of law, and British courts which tend to
look at a wide variety of sources of persuasive authority. Hence, British courts
are more open to including foreign jurisprudence in their judgments than
French courts. The third step was to explore the domestic dynamic surround-
ing adjudication of asylum cases in both countries, in particular, to look for
evidence of other actors that might encourage courts to consider foreign law.
In both cases, academics and refugee organizations play a role in the asylum
process. Academics are more interested in refugee law scholarship, and more
involved in asylum cases, in Britain than France. Refugee organizations ap-
pear to have an increasing role in both countries. This cultural account
strongly points to greater possibility, willingness and (to a lesser extent) en-
couragement for the inclusion of foreign jurisprudence in deciding on asylum
cases in Britain than France.
These ﬁndings have implications for the establishment of a common
European asylum system by 2012. Prior to the adoption of EC legislation in
the area of asylum and refugee law, this area of law was primarily regulated by
115 Bell (n 41) 20.
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the Refugee Convention (that is, an international treaty) and domestic legis-
lation. Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
requires that State practice be taken into account, together with the context, in
interpreting the Refugee Convention. British courts are more sensitive than
French courts to this provision, but they have tended to concentrate on state
practice of Commonwealth countries. The adoption of key EC Directives (and
Regulations) in the area of asylum and refugee law is forcing the judiciaries in
both France and Britain (and more generally across all the EUMember States)
to look at State practice within the Union. Here is where the real challenge lies
ahead for European judges. Whereas in the past, judges were free to consider
(or not) State practice from countries as far a ﬁeld as Australia or Canada, the
creation of a common European asylum system now requires them to look at
State practice from neighbouring countries. Hence, a whole new kind of trans-
state activity (based on reciprocity and trust between national courts), and
which is conducive to dialogue, needs to occur for this system to work. Given
the trend noted above, there are grounds for hope that such dialogue will
develop, though the cultural account suggests that it will develop more rapidly
in Britain than France.
The ﬁndings in this article are echoed in studies relating to other areas of
law, whether in the area of constitutional law, private law or public law,
namely considerable imperatives for, and a general trend towards, greater
transnational judicial dialogue.116 This process is well on its way in areas such
as human rights law and private international law, helped no doubt by the
European Court of Human Rights, and the inherent concept of transnational
contract, respectively.117 But even there we are still far from a systematic
use of foreign jurisprudence by the French and British courts. It is generally
recognized that comparative law does not play as important a role in admin-
istrative law (including refugee law) as in private law.118 This is particularly
true in areas of law such as (European principles of ) tort law and (European)
company law, where judges have engaged in a transnational and European
dialogue for quite some time. Markesinis and Fedke argue that matters that
are highly technical in content (eg wide areas of private and commercial law)
may be more prone to comparative work than ‘value-laden issues’.119 If one
accepts this argument, then refugee law probably falls into the category of
‘value-laden issues’, where particular values or policy considerations play an
important role, and where the use of foreign law is considered to be more
contentious. The area of human rights may be an exception where comparison
with other jurisdictions has always been considered to be appropriate due no
doubt to a ‘common ancestor’, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
116 Canivet, Andenas and Fairgrieve (n 5), Markesinis and Fedtke ‘The Judge as Comparatist
(n 5) and Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law (n 5).
117 Andenas and Fairgrieve, ‘Introduction’ in Canivet et al (n 5) xxxv–xxxviii.
118 R Errera (n 81)153.
119 Markesinis and Fedtke Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law (n 5) 138.
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with ‘descents’ through the European Convention on Human Rights and
the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.120 Moreover, as argued in this article, the
Europeanization of asylum law is likely to encourage transnational judicial
dialogue in this area.
120 S Kentridge ‘Comparative law in Constitutional Adjudication’ in Markesinis and Fedtke,
ibid 329.
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